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REED

v. TIAvwARD

[2:J C.2d
48 Ca1.App.2d 157 [119 P.2d 387]; Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Ca1.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, III A.L.R. 342J.)
Upon the premise that Dickinson died intestate and defendant Hayward is an heir, the latter's interest in the decedent's real property may be impressed 'with a lien to secure
the performance of her obligatioIt to support plaintiff even
though the estate is still in the process of administration, subject, of course, to administration of the estate. That proposition follows from the rules that title to the property of the
estate passes to the heir upon the death of the intestate (Prob.
Code, sec. 300); that pending administration an heir may
conveyor encumber his interest in the estate (UB Ca1.Jur.
827-829) ; that the heir's interest in personal property is subject to attachment and execution liens under appropriate restrictions (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 561, 688; Estate of Lind,
1 CaUd 291 [34 P.2d 486]), a~d the same applies to real
property (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 542, subd. 2; Noble v. Beach,
supra); and that a judgment lien attaches to the heir's interest pending probate (McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal.2d 468 [60
P.2d 1026J; Noble v. Beach, supra). Under the foregoing
rules there is no interference with the jurisdiction of the
probate court or the lawful and orderly administration of the
estate, inasmuch as any lien imposed is subject to the administration of the estate and all the rights pertinent thereto.
Hence, there is no valid reason why a lien may not be imposed.
upon the interest of defendant Hayward as an heir of Dickinson.

[9) Both Counts of the complaint aUege that defendants
ely and Durkee, respondents here, claim an interest in the
property described therein, but that such claim is without
right. Certainly in an action to quiet title and to establish
a lien on real property, plaintiff may join as defendant anyone
asserting an interest in the property in order that a complete
determination of the controversy may be had, and the priorities of rights established. (See Code Civ. Proc., secs. 379,
380; Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266 [47 P. 37, 56 Am.St.
Rep. 97, 37 L.R.A. 626J.)
For the foregoing re!lsons the judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Tray_
nor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
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[13] Eminent Domain-Compensation-What Constitutes Damaging.-In an action for damages for depreciation in the
value of property caused by the construction of the approaches to the San Francisco Bay Bridge, the plaintiff may
not claim compensation because all the residences except his
own, in a dElscribed area· in which his property is situated,
were eliminated by defendants and a street railway formerly
operating on the abutting street was removed.
.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. E. P. Shortall, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Action for damages for depreciation in value of property
caused by bridge approaches. Judgment for defendants reversed with directions.
Hubbard & Hubbard, John J. Batistich and J. C. Miller
for Appellant.

u. S. Webb, Attorney General, Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, C, C. Carleton, Robert E. Reed, F. M.
McAuliffe, Albert M. Monaco and Heller, Ehrman, White &
McAuliffe for Respondents.
CARTER, J .-The demurrers of defendants Board of Control, California Toll-Bridge Authority and State Department
of Public Works to plaintiff's complaint for damages in this
action in inverse condemnation were sUstained without leave
to amend.
Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of an improved lot .
situated on the west side of Sterling Street between the
intersection of that street with Bryant Street· and Harrison
Street in the City and County of San Francisco, the two
latter streets being parallel j that before the construction of
the improvement hereinafter mentioned Harrison Street waS
level with Sterling Street and he had access from his lot to
Harrison Street by footpaths and street railway; that a street
railway extending along Sterling Street served his property j
that the area around his property was formerly used for
residential purposes; that the construction of the approaches
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to the San Francisco Bay Bridge by defendants resulted in
the lowering of Harrison Street fifty feet, leaving as the
only access thereto an almost perpendicular flight of steps,
the destruction of the residence property in the area, the
removal of the street railway, and the erection of an elevated
highway between his lot and Bryant Street which he must
pass under to reach the latter street; that by reason of. the
foregoing his property has been damaged in the SUm of $14,000; and that he filed a claim for those damages with de.
fendant Board of Control which was rejected.
[1] The demurrer of defendant State Board of Control was
properly sustained inasmuch as it had nothing to do with
the construction of the improvement or the alleged damaging of plaintiff's property. It is not charged that the Board
of Control, a state agency, had anything to do with the construction of the improvement, it being interested only as the
recipient of the claim for damages filed by plaintiff.
[2] The failure to name the State of California as a party
defendant does not require an affirmance of the judgment.
The complaint contains all the elements necessary to state a
case against the State and has named the state agencies in
their capacity as such which had charge of the construction
of the improvement. The action is in effect one against the
State. Plaintiff's request for leave to substitute the State as
party defendant in place of the defendants Board of Control,
California Toll-Bridge Authority, and Department of Public
Works should have been granted. (Oalifornia Securities 00.
v. State, 111 Cal.App. 258 [295 P. 583J.J Under those circumstances it is not necessary to consider whether the TollBridge Authority under its statutory powers had authority
to do anything with reference to the construction of the improvement which plaintiff alleges caused the damages.
[3] The instant action is predicated Upon the constitu_
tional provision that private property may not be taken or
damaged for a pUblic purpose without the payment of jUst
compensation. (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 14.) That clause of
the Constitution is self-executing and hence neither consent
to SUe the State nOr the creation of a remedy by legislative
enactment is necessary to obtain relief thereunder (Rose v.
State of Oalifornia, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505]).
[4] Sections 667 and 688 of the Political Code relating to
claims against the State do not constitute an obstacle to recovery on the liability here involved. Section 688 by its terms
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those sections deal with the means and methods of payment
of claims, the conditions under which funds in the state
treasury may be allocated to pay claims, and the obtaining
of an appropriation from the Legislature when no funds are
available. They are concerned with the mechanics of the
financial operations of the State with relation to the payment
of claims. In order to obtain payment of a claim from funds
available therefor, or if not available from an appropriation
by the Legislature, the requirements of those sections must
be met. The requirement that claims be presented at least
four months before the meeting of the Legislature is to give
the Board of Control an opportunity to investigate them,
thus enabling the ensuing Legislature to give them more intelligent consideration. The clear intent of the statute is that
if a claim is to be given consideration at the next session of
the Legislature it should be presented four months prior
thereto and an investigation made.
[6] Section 667 makes no provision for a flat rejection or
approval of the claim by the board. It merely states that the
board shall, with the sanction of the governor, report to the
Legislature such facts and recommendations as may be proper.
(See Sullivan v. Gage, 145 Cal. 759, 765 [79 P. 537], conSidering similar requirements in the Political Code as then
written.) No provision is made for the next steps available
to the claimant if the recommendation is unfavorable. The
section does not specify What session of the Legislature the
four months' period must precede; that is, whether it is the
session next following the accrual of the claim or some subsequent session. If the claim accrued during the four months'
period
. immediately
. preceding a session of the Legislature,
certamly complIance could not be had with the section if the
next ensuing session of the Legislature were meant. If the
claim accrued four months and two days before the next session of the Legislature, the claimant would have only two
days in which to present his claim. That would be clearly
unreasonable when we consider that his right is created and
protected by the Constitution. A.lso as bearing upon the intent of the Legislature it should be noted that in 1941 the
Legislature added section 688.1 to the Political' Code (8tats.
1941, ch. 982, p. 2618), where it for the :first time expressly
provided that claims must be :filed with the board in cases of
inverse condemnation and adopted section 688 for the requirements in relation thereto. The act adding that section
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a property right in the nature of an easement in the street
which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is
.his private right, as distinguished from his right as a mem.
ber of the pUblic. That right has been described as an ease.
ment of ingress and egress to and from his. property or,
generally, the right of access over the street to and from his
property, and compensation must be given for an impairment thereof. We are not now inclined to question or disturb
that rule. (See Rose v. State of California, supra; Eachus
v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.
St. Rep. 149J ; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal.
67 [4 P.2d 139J; Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Cal.
29 [280 P. 109]; Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 160 Cal. 288 [116
P. 750J; Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [89
P. 330] ; Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274 [57 P.
82J ; Geurkink v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 P. 570J ;
Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559 [44 P. 307]; 10 Cal. Jur.
333-335; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, secs. 181-185; 49
A.L.R. 830; 98 A.L.R. 689.) The precise origin of that property right is somewhat obscure but it may be said generally
to have arisen by court decisions declaring that such right
exi~ted and recognizing it. (See 18 Am~Jur., Eminent Domam, sec. 181; 41 YaleL.J. 221.) For that reason, in the
determination of the· extent and character of that right
mo~t of the cases rely, without discussion, upon precedents
whIch fit or are analogous to the circumstances present in the
case before the court. If the question is one of first impres.
sion its answer depends chiefly Upon matters of policy,' a
factor the nature of which, although at times discussed by
the courts, is usually left undisclosed. It may be suggested
that on the one hand the policy underlying the eminent
domain provision in the Constitution is to distribute through.
out the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by
the making of public improvements. (See 41 YaleL.J. 221.
224; 52 Harv.L.Rev. 1176.1177; 3 Harv.L.Rev. 189-205.)
Manifestly; the addition to the eminent domain clause in con.
stitutions in most states, including California, of "or damaged" to the word "taken" indicates an intent to extend that
policy to embrace additional situations. On the other hand,
fears have been expressed that compensation allowed too liberally will seriously impede, if not stop, beneficial pUblic im.
provements because of the greatly increased cost. (See Davis
v. County Commissioners, 158 Mass. 218 [26 N.E. 848 850
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11 L.R.A. 750] ; 18 Va.L.Rev. 834:337;~ However, it is s~id
that in spite of that so-called pohcy the courts ca~ot ~.
nore sound and settled principles of .law. safeguardmg t e
rights and property of individuals. ThIS [Improvement] may
be of great convenience to the public gencr~ly, bu: the prop~
erties of abutting owners ought not be sacrIfic~d I~ order t.
on ConstItutional
secure I't" ,. and, quoting from Sedgwick
.
f
'fi Law.
the
,« The tendency under our system IS too 0 ten to sa~rI co .
individual to the community; and it seems very difficult m
reason to show why the State should not pay for, propert!
which it destroys or impairs the value, ?B well as for whatfJIt
Blu s,
h . II takes. . . . "(Liddick v. C'tty of Oouncil
pYSIcay
,
Iowa [5 N.W.2d 361, 372, 382].~ . , '
•
[9] In some degree those opposed pohcles are mamfested
in the conflict between the constitutional. mandate that com~
pensation be paid when private pro~erty IS ~ken or damaged
for a public purpose and the exerCIse of pohce power- where
compensation need not be paid. The line ~etween those two
concepts is far from clearly marked: It Will be recalled that
in the instant case it is alleged that by reason of the lo,,:er.
ing of Harrison Street fifty feet below the level ~f Sterlmg
Street the access that plaintiff formerly had to HarrIson Street
from Sterling Street has now been lost except for an alInost perpendicular flight of stairs. The condition resulted from the construction of a public improvement, namely, approaches to a
bridge spanning San Francisco Bay. It d?es not ~ppe~r that
any compelling emergency or public necessIty.requlred Its construction without the payment of compensatIOn for, property
damaged. Therefore, the Stat~ may not escape the payment
of compensation under the pohce power.
The ultimate effect of lowering Harrison Street was to
place plaintiff's property in a cul-de-sac. Wherea,s,. before he
had access to Harrison Street, the next intersectmg stre~t
from his property on Sterling Street, he now has acc~ss m
one direction only, that is, to Bryant Street, ~e next mtersecting street in the opposite direction. The eXistence of access in one direction to the general system of streets has be?n
impaired to the extent that there is now left only the staIrway. Plaintiff alleged that formerly Sterling Street was level
with Harrison Street, which may be interpreted to mean that
general access was available. He does state that formerly. he
had access by a streetcar line and footpaths.. That bemg

1\
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t rue his access by. those. modes has been lost except to the
extent that the staIrway IS a substitute for pedestrian access
In that resp.ect his property has been placed in a cul-de-sac:
Moreover, hIS request for leave to amend may be construed
to embrace a showing that formerly there was access to Harris?n Street for vehicular traffic, or at least that there was a
~Ight of ~ay or public street, improved or unimproved, join~ng SterlIng Street with Harrison Street. Furthermore it
IS apparently conceded by defendants that a cul-de-sac 'has
bee~cre~ted. That plaintiff's property has been damaged by
t~e ImpaIrI;nent can;not be here questioned. The allegation in
hIS complamt that It has been must be taken as true.
[10] Whether or not such impairment is compensable
must depend up.on the character and extent of his easement
of a~cess. Does It extend to a right to pr.ss to the next inter- .
sectmg streets? Nothing. more need be decided in this case;
we are not ~oncerned WIth the correct rule in a ease where
t~e obstructIOn occurs beyond the next intersecting street nor
WIth wha~ ~he rule may be for rural property. Practically
all authOrItIes hold, and we believe correctly, that no recovery
may' be had where the obstruction is beyond the next intersectmg street. (See cases cited: 4 McQuillin M .. I
Corp o:at'Ions [2d ed]
UlllClpa
. , 279-280, sec. 1527; 1 Lewis ,on Eminent
Domam [3d ed.], 350, 383, sees. 191, 203; 25 Am.Jur., Highways, see. 318; 49 A.L.R. 330; 93 A.L.R. 639.) [11] The
?xtent of the easem.ent of access may be said to be that which
IS reasonab~y reqUlred giving consideration to all the purpose~ to whIch the property is adapted. It is obvious that in
the m:stant case the damage suffered is greater and different
~han If the obstruction had been beyond the next. intersectmg street. Where formerly plaintiff had an outlet from his
property at both ends of Sterlin'" Street he now has
at only. one end , wh'lCh definitely 0
access
affects '
ingress to and egress
from hIS property. It would seem clear that the reasonable
~odes of. egress and ingress would embrace access to the next
~~ter~ectI~g street in both directions. It should be noted that
e rIght IS mor.e exte~sive than the mere opportunity to go
~n
the street .1mm~dIately in front of the property. (Rose
. tate o( Cal~forn~a, supra.) We are not confronted with
th; necesslty of balancing the conflicting policies heretofore
re erre.d. to without the aid of persuasive precedent. Man
authorItIes an~ writers have either declared or intimate~
that the creatIOn of a cul-de-sac, that is, the blocking of

;0
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access to the next intersecting street in one direction is. compensable, although the access still exists ~n .. the. opposit~ dir~c
tion to. an intersecting street. In other words, the easement.
is of that extent. (See Felton -v. State Highway Board, 47
Ga.App. 615 [171 S.E. 1981; Oity of Ohicago -v. Baker, 39
C.C.A. 318 [98 F. 8301; City of Ohicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill.
103 [42 N.E. 178,49 Am.St.Rcp. 142, 29 L.R.A. 568]; Davis
v. City of Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 244 [8 N.E.2d 3781; Falender -v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455 [114 N.E. 965] ; O'Brien v. Oentral Iron &7 Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218 [63 N.E. 302, 57 L.R.A.
508] ; Magdefrau v. Washington County, 228 Iowa 853 [~93
N.W. 5741; Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, s~pra; H~gh
barger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 [80 P. 633]; Burton v.
Fret£nd, 243 Mich. 679 [220 N.W. 672] ; Dean v. Ann Arbor
R. R., 137 Mich. 459 [100 N.W. 773]; Vanderburgh v. City
of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329 [108 N.W. 480, 6 L.R.A.N.S.
741] ; Locascio v. Northern Pac. Ry. 00., 185 Minn. 281 [240
N.W. 6611; In re Hun, 163 Minn. 439 [204 N.W. 534, 205
N.W. 613, 49 A.L.R. 3201 j Lowell v. Buffalo Oounty, 123 Neb.
194 [230 N.W. 842, 242 N.W. 452]; Mandell v. Board of
Com'rs of Bernalillo County, 44 N;M. 109 [99 P.2d 108] ; In r8
Grade Crossing Oom'rs, 210 App.Div. 328 [206 N.Y.S. 1031,
aff'd 240 N.Y. 612 [148 N.E. 727] ; I'll. re William &7 North WilUam Streets, 103 Misc'-313 (171 N.Y.S.1l61, aff'd 188 App.Div.
668 [177 N.Y.S. 318] ; Hiatt v. Oity of Greensboro, 201 N.C.
515 [160 S.E. 748] ; Coy v. City of Tulsa, 2 F.Supp. 411;
Atchison T. &7 S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180
Okla. 496 [71 P.2d6171; Sandstrom v. Oregon-Washington
R. &7 Nav. Co., 69 Ore. 194 [146 P. 803,49 L.R.A.N.S. 8891;
Cooke v. City of Portland, 136 Ore. 233 [298 P. 900] ; In re
Vacation of Part of Melon Street, 182 Pa. 397 [38 A. 482,38
L.R.A. 275]; Spang &7 Co. v. C()rrtmonweaUh, 281 Pa. 414
[126 A. 781] j Hindes v. Allegheny Oounty, 123 Pa.Sup.Ct.
469 [187 A. 219] ; Johnsen v. Old Colony R. Co., 18 R.I. 642
[29 A. 594]; Illinois Oent. R. 00. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn.
446 [186 S.W. 10531 ; City of Texarkana v. Lawson, (Tex.Civ.
App.) 168 S.W. 867; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, [2d
ed.] vol. 4, 276-278; sees. 1526-1527 j Lewis on Eminent Domain, (3d ed.] vol. 1,350-351, sec. 191; 16 Harv.L.Rev. 372;
39 YaleL.J. 128.) There are eases to the contrary (see 49
A.L.R. 330, 93 A.L.R. 639), but some of them are based upon
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~ constitutional provision which allows compensation for takmg alone, no mention being made of a damaging. Many of
them a~vance no sound .reason f?r not permitting recovery,
a~d arrIve at the result wIth un enlIghtening phrases which furnIsh no. real test. [12] We do not fe~r that permitting reco~ery m. cases of cul-de-sacs created in a municipality will
serIOusly Impede the construction of improvements assuming
the fear of such an event is real rather than fancied .• The damage to the property owner is immediate and direct. The value
of the use of the proper~y is directly affected. To be able to get
o.nto the st::eet ImmedIately in front of the property is of
lIttle val~e If tha~ is as far as he can go. If he has access to
the next I~tersectmg s~re~t in both directions and one way is
cut o.ff, hIS ease.ment, If It has any value to him at all, has
c~rtamly been Impaired. We conclude, therefore, that the
rIg~t of access extends in both directions to the next intersectmg street.
Defendants contend that there are cases in California contrary to the foregoing views. In Wolff v. Oity of Los Angeles,
49 Ca1.App. 400 [193 P. 862], the portion of the street which
was graded was a considerable distance from plaintiffs' property ~nd bey~nd an intersecting street, as was pointed out
by.thlS court In denying a hearing. In Oity of San Mateo v
Ra~lroad Oommission, 9 Ca1.2d 1 [68 P.2d 713], it does no~
appear that the closing of the street placed the property
owners on a cul-de-sac.. ~tree~s crossing the railroad right of
way were closed, but It IS saId that as· far as appears from
the rec~rd the pro~erty abutted upon either a county road or
state hlgh~a.y w~lCh paralleled the sides of the railroad.
Mor~over, It IS pomted out that the property owners were not
partIes to a pr.oc~eding before the Railroad Commission and
t~at t~~ commISSIOn had "not attempted to adjudicate such
rIghts.
The case was referred to and distinguished in Rose
v. State of Oalifornia, supra, at page 731. While that case
may h~ld that grade crossings may be eliminated pursuant to
!~e pohce power, we .do not interpret it as holding that prop. ty .m~y be placed m a cuI-de-sac by the construction of a
pubhc Improvement without the payment of compensation
dB'
Reference is made to Bigley v. Nunan 53 Cal 403
B
d f S·
,.
,an
rOWn
v. oar 0
~perv~ors, 124 Cal. 274 [57 P. 82]. Neither
of those cases
mvolved. a cul-de-sac . Both of them were cond .
cerne WIth a narrowmg of the width of a street. (See Hargra v. Hodgdun, 89 Cal. 623 [26 P . 1106])
. The B·191ey case
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is based upon the theory that the right of access is not peculiar and private to an abutting owner, which is out of harmony with Rose v. State of Oalifornia, supra, at pages 727728, and the authorities there cited. In the Brown case the
only question before the court was .whether the board of
supervisors had the power to narrow the width of the street
by virtue of its authority to close .or vacate s~reets. The
question of whether an action for damages under the Constitution would lie was not involved. The discussion apparently
to the contrary of the views herein expressed was unnecessary.
Indeed, the court, near the close of its opinion, quoted with
approval from Symons v. San Francisco, 115 Cal. 555, [42
P. 913, 47 P. 453], where it was said: "Whether the order
will have the effect to diminish the value of the plaintiffs'
land, or to cause them damage, is nota ground for annulling
the act of the board of supervisors, and cannot be considered
in this proceeding. If the board of supervi,sors had the au,
thorityto pass the order, and the plaintiffs have sustained
any legal damage by reason thereof, they must seek reUef in
a direct proceeding therefor.". (Emphasis added.)
.
Defendants contend that the creation of the· 'cul-de-sac
causes nothing more than mere circuity of travel which is not
compensable, citing Walff v. Oity of Los Angeles, supra.
The inapplicability of that case has heretofore been discussed.
In any event, the phrase "circuity' of travel" has varied
meanings and· is frequently misused by the courts..
There is more than mercly a diversion of traffic when a
cul-de-sac is created. The ability to travel to and from th'e
property to the general system of streets in one direction is
lost. One might imagine many circumstances, as has been
shown by defendants, in which recovery should~ot"be pe:r~
mitted or where the reasons for recovery· in the cuI-de-sac
cases might not be logically applied, hut we are. h.ere concerned with the particular facts of this case and do not pur.
port to declare the law for all cases. under allcircumstailces.
[13] The other items of damages claimed by plaintiff' nrc
not compensable. He asserts that all the.residences, except his
own, in a described area in which his property is situated
, :
.
were eliminated by defendants, and that
a street
ratlway.
formerly operating on Sterling Street has been removed.
There is no property right appurtenant to plaintiff's property
on Sterling Street which entitles him to the maintenance 01

.'
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the residences or the continuous operation of the existing
street railway. The removal of the residences and leaving the
property vacant did not constitute a nuisance. It does not
appear that the elevated road between plaintiff's property
and Bryant Street in any way interferes with his access to
the latter street or impairs any easement, if one exists, to
light, air or view.
The judgment is reversed, and the court below is directed
to permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint if he be so
advised in conformity with the views herein expressed.

l',

:i

1: :
;1

GibsoD) C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

1\

"11.

EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the judgment against the property owner should be reversed, but for
reasons different from those stated by my associates. And as
the decision vitally affects the public interest in that it may
largely determine whether highway improvements essential
for modern transportation can be made without incurring
liability for damages beyond the capacity of the state or a
municipality reasonably to pay, I deem it appropriate to state
the grounds upon which I believe the determination should
rest.
When the government acts, either by way of legislation or
by the exercise of any other legitimate means,1 to promote the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, a large
area exists in which private interests may be restricted, impaired, or entirely destroyed by such action without compensation for the resulting loss or diminution in value of the
property. (Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 [48 S.Ct. 246,
72 L.Ed. 568]; Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S, 16 [25 L.Ed.
980] ; Omnia Oommercial 00. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502
[43 S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773] ; Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal.
416 [132 P. 584, L.R.A. 1916B, 1248], affd. in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 [36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348] ; Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 00., 272 U.S. 365 [47 S.Ct. 114,
71 L.Ed. 303]; Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239
U.S. 486 [36 S.Ct. 206, 60 L.Ed. 396]; Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52 [35 S.Ct. 501, 59 L.Ed. 835] ; Reinman v. Little
i

i

l' 'The expression 'police power' is sometimes lised in a very broad
sense, including all legislation and almost every function of civil government." 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 257, pp. 971, 972.
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.
[35 S Ct . 511, 59 L.Ed~ BOO].) Th~s .
Rock, 237 U.S. 171
t t' 't in furtherance of the public
the O'overnmen 0 ac
. ""
'. to' .
power 0 f
"'.
•
r bTt for the resultmg
lllJury
good without lllCUr~lllg la 1
k own as the police power.
private individuals IS co~monthat ~he Constitution supposes
It 'has been held many lml~s
er and must be construed
&; NW R 00 v.
the pre-existence of the po Ice powh . '
t that fact (0 '/,Gago
...•
with reference. 0
. III 625 [158 N.E.376, 55 A:L.R.
Illinois Oommerce OO~t ..' 326 St 'te Bd of Education, 168 La.,
4] B den v Lou'/,S~ana
a·
, 'd . k
65 j or,
.
7 A L R 1183]' Oarthage v.Fre er'/,G ,
1005 [123 So. 655, 6
. . . 19 An:.St.Rep. 490, 10 L.R.A.
122 N.Y: 268 [25 N.E 80 '415 [58 P. 1071,77 Am.St.Rep.
178] j Re Morgan, 26 ~t Am Jur Constitution'aILaw, sec.
.',
.
269, 47 L.R.A. 52] j see

\Y

Ci

245, p. 969.)
l'
of improvements is concerned,
be to promote and insure
So far as the construc. Ion
however, even though theIr p~rpose the right of the State to
the public safety and convemence,
t f" J'ust"
t " ithout the paymen 0
.
take "pri:ate proper y ~essl forbidden by both the emicompensatI~n, has. b.een e:~he state Constitution and the du.e
nent dQmam provislonFO rteenth Amendment to the Constiprocess clause of .the ou
I Const., art. I, sec. 14;
tution of the Umted States. Oh(~a. 166 US 226 [17 S.Ct.
'
B &; Q R ROo. v.
wago,
. .
. .
'f
Oh~cago.
. . ' Ob' I under these prOVISIons, 1
581, 41 L.Ed. 979).)
vlo':litself for a public use, i~ is
the State approPrIate~ the. la t domain with a correspondmg
lue of the land. And the
exercising its power 0 emlll::
liability to pay the owne~ ~i=tion' entitling the owner to
amendment to .the. state ons
his ro erty is "damaged,"
just compensatlO~ ~n ,;:~::~e~~r th:p~liC use, indicates an
as well as when 1 IS
'.
f om ensation in the area
intention to li?er~li~e the p~~c~:gu~she~ from an actual apof conse~uentIal mJury, as s An eles' Ry., supra, p. 616;
propriatlOn. (Eachus .v. L~~ Caf 492 501 [6 P. 317, 56
Reardon v. San Franc~sco,.
.. . '
ra) The term
~h:~~i~:Pa diminution in
Am.Rep. 109] ; Rigney ;~ ?~ty
"consequential damage, IS use. d b the State occlUlioned
value. of land not actually acqUlre Y
,
by the public improvement.
. d that not all consequenBut it is uniformly recogmze
.
ded to be included
tial damage to private int~res~ ;;:at:t:~ause. In the words
within the scope of the emmen
l
. Coal Co v Mahon,
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsy vanw
• •
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260 U.S. 393, 412 [43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322]: "Government
hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property co~ld not be diminished without paying for every such
cha~ge In .the gen:ral. law [as the Pennsylvania statute under
cons.IderatIOn forbIddIng the mining of coal within 150 feet of
the ~mp:oved property of another]. . .. One fact for consid~ratIOn m determining ... [the] limits [of the police powerJ
IS the. exten: of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
~,agmtude: In most if not in all cases there must be an exerCIse of emIne~t domain and compensation to sustain the act.
So the queS~IOn depends upon the particular facts." The
?ourt r.ecogmzed that the question as to when compensation
lS reqUIred to be made for a diminution in value of private
property under the eminent domain clause cannot be disposed
of by general prop~sitions; t?e problem is one "of degree."
(p. 416.) Also thIS court, m Rose v. State of California
713, 737 [123 P.
2d 505]
.'
.19 Cal.2d
I
, held that th e d·.
Immutlon
~n va ue of. land occasioned by a public improvement divertmg the mam flow of traffic from in front of the
..
premISes IS
noncompensable. And the government may condemn private
property ~nd ere.ct upon it a jail or "pest house" without
?omp.ensatmg adJacent property owners for the undeniable
ImpaIrment of their property values as a result of such public
u;;. P (See Eachus v. Los Angeles·etc. Ry., J03 Cal. 614, 617
.. 75.0, 42 A~.St.Rep. 149J; Rigney v. Chicago 102 ill
[
~\~803; Cdy of W~nchester v.. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 550-552 [144
. . 33, 36 A.L.R. 520] ; C~ty of Geary v. Moore 181 Okl
6716 [75 P.2d 891], distinguishing Oklahoma City' v. Vette~·
2 Okla. 196 [179 P. 473, 4 A.L.R. 1009].)
,
From these decisions it seems clear that a ,determ· f
as to. w~ether the diminution in value of land resultin~n~r~:
pubh~ Improvement, as distinguished from a taking of the
~and ~tself for. p~blic use, falls within the scope of eminent
omalI~ nece~sItatmg th~ payment of compensation requires
a consIderatIOn of the Importance of the . t
t ff .
.
meres a ected
(St t f C·
ae 0
alifornw v. Marin Mun. W. Dist., 17 Cal.2d 699·
706 [11~ P.2d 651J.) In considering this problem the court
~ust weIgh the relative interests of the public and th . d'
vId~al, ;~ as to arrive at a just balance in order that g~~:r~~
~en WI. not be unduly restricted in the proper exercise of
~s fu~ctlOn for the public goodj while at the same time giving
u~ e ect ~o t?~ policy in the eminent domain clause of insurmg the mdivldual against an unreasonable loss occasioned
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by the exercise of governmental power. In this connection,
a distinction must be made between a diminution in value
because of an act of a private individual and the decrease in
value resulting from a public highway improvement. Obviously, the courts will be more ready to protect even the less
important interests connected with the use of land against
interference by private individuals whose acts have no pubhc
utility, than when the governmental power is exercised in
behalf of a public improvement for the general welfare.
Therefore, the fact that a particular interest has been protected against impairment by a private person does not necessarily mean that it is of sufficient importance, as against
the state, to be included in the terrn "private property"
within the meaning of the eminent doma,in clause of the Constitution. (See, for example, the discussion of the distinction
between impairment of view by a private individual and by
a proper highway improvement, in my dissenting opinion in
People v. Ricciardi, post, p. 390 [144 P.2d 799].) The factors
to be considered are, on the one hand, the magnitude of the damage to the owner of the land, and, on the other-, the desirability
and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the
danger that the granting of compensation will tend to retard
or prevent it.
(Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra;
Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn.. 357, 366, 369 [111
A. 354, 12 A.L.R. 669] ; Davis v. Oounty Commrs., 153 Mass.
218 [26 N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 750J ; Cram v. City of Laconia,
71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635, 57 L.R.A. 282] ; Richmond v. City of
Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223 [185 S.E. 411]; see 34 Columb.L..Rev.
938; 42 Columb.L.Rev. 596, 637; and .seeArcher. v .O~ty of
Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 23, 24 11~~~.2<k;l] ;O/1jIa".a,,~~
L. A. County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d .61i 63 :[119. P.. 2d
23].)
•. if; '.
!.
.;"i
In addition, before compensation maybe denied,.th~;cour~
must find that the particular improvemen~ is not.~nrea~
sonably more drastic or injurious than necessary, to achieve
the public objective. (Williams v. Los An{}"eZes ~y. Co? 15.0
Cal. 592, 595, 596 [89 P. 330] ; Lanev. Sa~Diego EZec. ,Ry;
Co., 208 Cal. 29, 35 [280 P. 109] ; TO,wn, of .Winds.or v. :Wh.itney, supra, p. 369; Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107 (100 ,So.
147,33 A.L.R. 682] ; and see note, 35 Columb.L.Rev. 938, 939;
11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, sec. 266, p.l006.) Thus, if,
in balancing these factors, the court decides that the interelilt
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~ffected

by the improvement which results in a diminution
In the value of the land is of sufficient importance to require
the payment of compensation under the eminent domain clanse
of the Constitution, it is not necessary to consider the improvemeD;t as a "damaging" of the land; since the interest
IS recognIzed as entitled to the protection of the law, it becom~ a 'pr~perty righ~ included in the term "private property . wIt.hIn the meamng of article I, section 14 of the state
ConstItutIon. In the event, however, that the interest is
deemed Of. insufficient magnitude to warrant the payment of
compensatIOn under the eminent domain provision it obviously is not "private property" within the scop~ of that
cla~e, and the diminution in value of the land attributable
to It, when affected by public improvement, falls within the
area. of uncompensated loss occasioned by the exercise of essentIal governmental power. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, see Rose v. State of California, S~tpra, at p. 737.)
.And the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated
that ~he recogni.tio?- and definition of the interests in prope~ty Included wIthIn the term "private property" are essen~Ial1y matte~s which each state is permitted to determine for
Itself. (Rc1,chelderfcr v.Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 319 [53 S Ct
177, 77 L.Ed. 331,83 A.L.R. 1429] ; Sauer v. New York,
u.s. 536, 548 [27 KCt. 686, 51 L.Ed. 1176].)
In balancing the necE-ssity for a public improvement against
the ext~nt of d~mage sustained by an individual in order to
dete~In~ .the r1g~t to compensation, there need be no fear
t~at IndIVId~al rIghts will be unduly subordinated to the
rIghts ~f SOCIety, for each claimed exercise of governmental
power IS su~ject to judicial examination as to whether the
means exerc~sed are reasonable, both in nature and extent.
(Town of Wtndsor.v. Whitney, supra, at p. 369.) And although
the rule may be dI~cult to apply, it is not an arbitrary one.
An analogous doctrIne underlies a determination of the reaso~ableness of conduct in the law of negligence, which re~Ulres a. court to weigh the magnitude of the risk involved
~n a p~rtI7u~ar act against its utility or the particular manner
In W~lC? .It IS d~n.e. (2 Rest., Torts, sec. 291.) Obviously, as
the JU~IcIal dec:sIOns on the subject increase in number, the
result In a specIfic case may be predicted with increasing accuracy. (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 [31
S.Ct. 186, 55 L.Ed. 112].) One rule recently anIlounced by
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this court in approaching such a proble!ri- is: that~,~~ ,~eaSt ,if
the property owner would have no eanse ?f;a.C~IO~ )ver~ !1
he, ca~,cl~l:rn ,n();I~~m:
Private person to inflict the damage,
' C·t· 'f' 'L '.Ange~es
pensation from the state. (Arc h er v. .~ 0 . ; "Dsr't:(.,j,'
supra, at p. 24.) But in the area ofindIytdual .~lglit~ ~yet
uncharted by judicial decision, a court must weIgh the mter' . ' . '.
..'
ests affected in each case.
The question whether a property owner. is entitled t? coT?~
pensation under the eminent domain clause of, t~~ Cal~fo:ma
Constitution (art. I, sec. 14) when his property IS pl~ce~ m a
cul-de-sac by the obstruction or vacation. of:, o~e'}~d' of a
street upon which the property abuts, butwhe.t;e tl(~ ~bstrue
tion is not directly in front of the property, }s/o,~~ ~f. first
impression in California. Althoug.h an mt~r~~r?~~~'\V1t~ the
abutting owner's right of access m one. dlrec:~a0Il:0:UY'. ~u~
leaving a less convenient means of egres~ 1TI anoth~r direc:lo~,
has been held not to be a taking of prIvate pr?p'~rty WithIn
the prohibition of the due process clause of • ~e:F~nrl:eenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution (Met/6rv., C1,ty of
Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 [19 S.Ct. 106!, 41 L.E.d..199]), a
majority of the courts which have consldered the rIght of a
property owner to damages, under the. eminent· dom~in clause
of the jurisdiction, for bej.ng placed 1TI a cm-de-sac have .allowed recovery to those in the block where the obstruction
occurs, even though one entrance to the block is left open.
(Felton v. State Highway Board, 47 Ga.App. 615 [171 S.E.
198] ; City of Chicago v. Baker,-39 C.C.A. 318 [98 F. 830];
City of Chicago v. Burcky, 158 Ill. 103 [4~ N.E. 17~, 49 Am.
St.Rep. 142, 29 L.R.A. 568]; Davis v. edy of Chwago, 290
Ill.App. 244 [8 N.E.2d 378]; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind.
455 [114 N.E. 965, 967] ; Highbarger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331
[80 P. 633]; Burton v. Freun~, 243 ~ich. 67? [220 N:W·
672]. Vanderburgh v. City of M1,nneapoltS,98 Mmn,329 [108
N.W~ 480, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 741] ; Lowell v. Buffalo County, 123
Neb. 194 [230 N.W. 842,242 N.W.452] ; Co~ v. City of Tulsa,
2 F.Supp. 411; Atchison etc. Ry. v. Term~nal Oil M~ll Co.,
180 Okla. 496 [71 P.2d 617]; Sandstrom v. Oregon-Wash.
R. &; Nav. Co., 69 Ore. 194 [146 P. 803,.49 L.R.A;N.S. 889] ;
In re Melon Street, 182 Pa.397 [38 A. 482,38 A.L.R. 275] ;
City of Texarkana v. Lawson, (Tex.Civ.App.) 168 S.W. 867.
Contra: Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.,' 109 Conn. 151
[145 A. 7561 ; Micone v. City of Middletown, 110 Conn. 664
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[149 A. 408]; l'aylor v. Oooke, 113 Conn. 162 [154 A. 349,
351] ; Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584 [154 A. 131], distinguishing
Johnson v. Mayor, 148 Md. 432 [129 A. 648] ; Smith v. Boston,
61 Mass. 254; Davis v. Oounty Oommrs., 153 Mass. 218 [26
N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 7501; Nichols v. Inhabitants of Richmond, 162 Mass. 170 [38 N.E. 501] ; Arcadia Realty 00. v.
Oity of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 273 [30 S.W.2d 995, 997] ; Wilson
v. Kansas Oity, - - Mo. - - [162 S. W.2d 802]; Oram v.
Oity of Laconia, 71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635,57 L.R.A. 282] ; New
York etc. Ry. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio 134 [190 N.E. 562, 93 A.L.R.
632] ; Oity of Bellevue v. Stedman. 138 Ohio 281 [34 N.E.2d
7~9] ; Oity of ~ynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1 [133 S.E. 674J ;
Rwhmond v. O~ty of Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223 [185 S.E. 411].)
But by the great weight of authority, as a matter of law, no
compensation may be obtained because of an obstruction to
or the vacation of a street in another block, even though the
value of the complaina.nt's property is substantially reduced thereby, and this regardless of whether the particular
state Constitution requires compensation solely for property
"t ak en " or "tak en or damage d ." (O~ty
. of East St. Louis v.
O'Plynn, 119 Ill. 200 [10 N.E. 395, 59 Am.Rep. 795]; Buhl
v. Port St. Union Depot 00., 98 Mich. 596 [57 N.W. 829, 23
L.R.A. 392J; Locascio v. Northern Pac. Ry. 00., 185 Minn.
281 [240 N.W. 661] ; In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439 [204 N.W.
534, 5.38-540, 205 N.W. 613, 49 A.L.R. 320] ; Ohicago etc. Ry.
v. Pngmore, 180 Okla. 124 [68 P.2d 90] ; Oooke v. Oity of
Portland, 136 Ore. 233 [298 P. 900] ; Spang & Co. v. Oommonwealth, 281 Pa. 414 [126 A. 781]; Hindes v. Allegheny
Oounty, 123 Pa.Sup.Ct. 469 [187 A. 219] ; Hyde v. Minnesota
etc. Ry., 29 S.D. 22 [136 N.W. 92,99,40 L.R.A.N.S. 48] ; Lee
v. Oity of Stratford [Tex.Com.App., adopted by Supr. Ct.],
125 Tex: 179,81 S.W.2d 1003; Oity of El Paso v. Sandfelder,
(Tex. CIv.App.) 118 S.W.2d 950; Jackson v. Birmingham etc.
00.,154 Ala. 464 [45 So. 660] ; Whitsett v. Union Depot & R.
00., 10 Colo. 243 [15 P. 339] ; Jarnagin v. Louisiana Highway Oom., (La.A~p.). 5 So.2d 660; Mandell v. Board of
Oommrs. of Bernahllo 00., 44 N.M. 109 [99 P.2d 108] ; Sanders. v. To~n of Smithfield, ~21 N.C. 166 [19 S.E.2d 630];
Chwago ill N. W. Ry. v. Ra~lroad Oom., 167 Wis. 185 [167
N.W.266].)
The quest~o~ im.mediately arises as to the reason, if any,
for such a dIstInctIOn. What are the factors which have induced courts to recognize the damage of one owner as com-

Dec. 1943]

363

BACICH V. BOARD OF CONTROL
[23 C.2d 343]

pensable and that of another as noncompensable when the diminution in value of the properties of both is occasioned by
the same public' act T So far as the mere inconvenience of
traveling any additional distance necessitated by the inability
longer to use the obstructed street is concerned, no compelling
reason for such a distinction is warranted by logic, as it is
difficult to justify the denial of compensation to· dne whose
property is located directly across the firstinte'rsectmg street'
while allowing recovery to the person owning ;the' lot on the
corner of the block in which the cul-de-sM~xists;:A.nd because many of the courts have confined cOnBiderationof the
damage caused by the obstruction to what they term the necessity for "circuity of travel," the conclusion that th~ allowance of recovery shouId not be extended to the whole 'neighborhood with a probable throttling of public· improvements,
has influenced a substantial number of them to deny compensation altogether. (Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry., 141
Ind. 604 [39 N.E. 223, 50 Am.St.Rep. 343, 34 L.R.A. 769] ;
Nichols, v. Inhabitants of Richmond, (Mass.) supra; Oram v.
Oity of Laconia, (N.H.) supra; Henry L. Doherty & 00. v.
Joachim, 146 Fla. 50 [200 So. 238].) Also some decisions
which follow the majority view have treated recovery in a
cul-de-sac case as an exception to the rule generally announced that circuity of travel occasioned by a proper highway improvement, or regulation, is a noncompensable item of
damage.
But the traveling of additional distances occasioned by
modern traffic engineering to make travel more safe and to
adapt the highway system to the adequate disposal of the
increasingly heavy burden of automobile traffic--:-as, for example, by the construction of divided highways fori, variou&
types of traffic, or the re-routing of traffic by one-",ay regU.;'
lations or the prohibition of left-hand turns-"'--Js anele.rilt~nt
of damage for which the property bwner1maynot (coriipl~iIi'
in the absence of arbitrary action. '(OitfJ'of 8aiYt'¥ateo l v.
Railroad Oom., 9 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 10 [68 P"2d;,71:3] ; 8e~'rnote '1()O(
A.L.R. 487, 491-493.) It is, therefor~,hot;'$U:fprfsingjt~~t;
many courts have refused compensation·;iJftchl~de.:sa~!;Ms~k
because of the similarity in problems'so faras'tl1e qttestio:iit
of circuity is concerned. And,' therefore, hCteSting !fi:ie~.':Diiitits~
of the majority rule, mere "circuity'of,travel,'~
the-sen~e;
that it refers to the additional distan<le .required to be tra:"
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versed because of a proper highway construction should not
be us~d to justify the allowance of compensation to the owner
ab~ttIng upon the street in the block where the obstruction
eXIsts.
. There is a material difference, however, between the situatIon of. the property owner in the block where one end of the
street IS obstructed and that of the persons whose lots abut
on the same street beyond the first intersection. Whereas
f~rmerly he had an outlet at both ends of the street on which
hIS .lot fronts, after the obstruction, he has but one. This is
obv~ously not true .of the landowners beyond the first intersectIOn, .for they stIll have access in either direction.
. B~t, ~t may be asked, of what practical significance is this
dIStInction, so far as damage to the' property owner is concerne~ , If, for example, the land is used for business or industrIal purposes, the fact that it is in a block where the
~treet t~rmi?ates may seriously affect the easement of access,
In cons~derIng the full and benefieial use of the propert
All vehic!es entering the block must either turn around :;
back out In order to leave it, to this extent impairing the right
of egre~s. In the case of trucks or other large vehicles such
a reqUIrement may sUbstantially interfere with the highest
and be~t use of the property. (See Cartmell v. City of
Marysv~lle, 231 Ky. 666 [22 S.W.2d 102, 104].)
And the
owner of a lot so located is more adversely affected than is
one whose property abuts upon a street restricted to one-way
traffic, for In the latter case free ingress and egress is possible
.y~t, even though the interference with the use of the land
wIthIn the block where the cul-de-sac is created is materially
1reater than that of the property beyond the first intersect on upon the same. street, the question remains whether the
owner s access to hIS property is so materially affected as to
warr~nt the. ~ayment of compensation under the eminent
domaIn prov~IOn of the California Constitution.
The n.ecesslty .for arterial freeways, uninterrupted by num~rous Interse~tlOns, in order to dispose of vehicular traffic
~llely and efficIently is a matter of growing public concern
owance of ~amages. to the property owners on each street
form.erly crOSSIng a hIghway which is to be rebuilt for the
reqUIrements of fast moving or interurban traffic for a distan~e ~f a few or many miles, even if confined to one block on
eac sIde of the freeway, might prove so burdensome as to
stop or substantially decrease needed improvements. (See
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Davis v. County Commrs. [Mass.], supra, at p. 850; Cram v.
City of Laconia [N. H.], supra; Richmond v. City of HUtton
[W. Va.], supra; 13 Va. L. Rev. 334~337.) Itm:nst be remeDi~
bered also that to the amount of damages awarded must be
added the probable expense of defending hull.dre'ds of 'suits.
At the same time, however, in view of the policy underlying
the eminent domain provision of the Constituticin;; the ,court
must give adequate recognition to the liardship:,to)lillndi;.
vidual in a block ending in a dead end,mate-rially' 'idrect~g~
as the obstruction does, the right of egreSs from' his prop~rti·
In addition, the possibility of locating, and: constructing tli~
improvement in such a way as to leave the properlY ,OWh~l
with II. way out in each direction along thestre¢t upon whicli
he abuts has a direct connection with 'thelrniitation that,' iIi
order to avoid liability for compertsa1ion,'the'pladement('of
the improvement and its manner of constrlictionmust" not
be unreasonably more drastic or injurious than isreasonabl,
required to achieve the necessary end.
eXample,', ordi~
narily, in constructing an arterial freeway the Objectives of
the project may be served and a method of egress provided
for property owners by the construction of lOcal service roads,
paralleling the main freeway, into which the ~raffic:' from the
side streets may pass and enter or cross the freeway at loca~
tions consistent with safety. (See People v. Ricciardi, post.)
Were the construction of such service roads to 'be approved
a proper use of the land owned by the state for highway
purposes without subjecting the state to liability to abutting
property owners for such improvements, the cost. of such
service roads would constitute a definitely ascertainable item,
thus obviating the uncertainty in estimati.il.g in advance· the
damages to the property owners, were the streets to be 'termi~
nated so as to create cul-de-sacs. Under such circumstances,
where governing authorities fail or. refuse to .include such
service roads as a part of the project, or in the relatively few
situations where their construction is not possible, the damage sustained by the individual should be borne by the public. But the majority opinion in the Ricciardi case, by creating a cause of action in every property owner abutting upon
the lane constructed for local traffic along the route of an
arterial highway, certainly offers no inducement to the state
to include such features in highway improvements, and makes
the balancing of the respective interests of the public and
the land owner a close question. However, bec,ause circum-
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stances readily can be visualized where, after a block is closed
at one end, the owner's access to his property from the street
may be as effectively blocked as though an obstruction were
~laced directly in front of his premises/ in my opinion the questIon of compensa?le impairment of ingress and egress should
be left for the trIer of fact to determine.
. Bu~ in ascertaining the amount of damage arising from the
ImpaIrment of the easement of access, the jury may consider
only compensable elements of injury, relating to the interference. with the ingress to and egress from the property insofar as It affects the uses to which the property is adaptable.
Su~h elements as the additional distance which one is reqUIred to travel upon the public street in order to reach the
prop~rty and the divergence of travel occasioned by the highway II?provements should be excluded from the testimony of
th~ ~Itn~sses and the consideration of the jury. (People v.
R~ccwrd2, supr'!; Rose. v. S~ate of Oalifornia, s'upra, at p. 737;
Dantzer v. Indwnapohs Umon Ry., supraj Grigg Hanna Lumber, etc., Co., v. Van Wagoner, 294 Mich. 346 [293 N.W. 675,
678-679]; Tomaszewski v. Palmer Bee 00., 223 Mich. 565
[194 N.W. 571] ; Atchison etc. Ry; v. Terminal Oil Mill Co.
(Okla.), supra, at p. 619; Ohicago etc. Ry. v. Prigmore (Okla.),
supra, at pp. 91,92; Henry L. Doherty &; Co. v. Joachim (Fla.),
supraj Oanady v. Ooeur D'Alene Lumber 00., 21 Idaho 77
[120 P. 830]; Jarnagin v. La. Highway Com. (La. App.),
sup.ra,· Sanders v. Town of Smithfield (N.C.), supra, at p. 634;
Ohu;ago & N. W. Ry. v. Railway Com. (Wis.), s'upra.)

clarification as to its extent and character." What follows is
a definition amplifying that right to -make it a b'a:sis for re-'
covery in the present case in terms of the invasion of property
rights. As there is no invasion of traditional rights, a new
right is created by the simple process of redefinition'. The
frontiers of the right of ingress and egress are thus freely
advanced to make the very recovery in question a foregone
conclusion.
'
The real basis of the decision must be found in the considerations that moved the majority to grant recovery .. The key
to those considerations lies in the statement in the majority
opinion that "If the question is one of first imp'tes'sion its
answer depends chie:tly upon matters of p6licy,a i factor the
nature of which, although at times discussed by the courts,
is usually left undisclosed." By way of revelation in the pres~
ent case, the opinion goes on to declare' that "on the one'
hand the policy underlying the eminent domain provision
in the Constitution is to distribute throughout the community
the loss infEcted upon the individual by the making of public improvements . . . On the other hand, fears have, been
expressed that compensation allowed too liberally will serio'
ously impede, if not stop, beneficial public' improvements
because of the greatly increased cost ... In some degree those
opposed policies are manifested in the conflict between the
constitutional mandate that compensation would be paid when
private property is taken or damaged for a public, purpose
and the exercise of the police power where compensation need
not be paid."
One is led to expect that the solution of the problem will
lie in the weighing of these two policies, but it is not clear
that the majority arrives at its solution in this manner. A
review of the facts is summarily followed by the rule for
which the case now stands: "It would 'seem clear that the
reasonable modes of egress and ingress embrace access to the
next intersecting street in both directions. It should be noted
that the right is more extensive than the mere opportunity to
go on to the street immediately in front of' the property.'~,'
Having thus reached its conclusion: without stating why one
policy outweighed the other, the opinion suggests thatitbal~
anced policies with the aid of precedents. "Weare not confronted with the necessity of balancing thecon:tlicting (policies
heretofore referred to without the aid, of persuash:e prece~
dent." It is thus left in doubt whether' the weigJ1ilig ofpoH.

. ~URTI.S,. J.-I agree with the conclusion reached in the rnaJO~It! OpInIOn on the ground expressed in the concurring
OpInIOn.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion declares that the allowance of recovery to the owner in this case "depends largely upon the
c?arac.ter and extent of his property right." It seeks such a
;~gh: In th~ right of ingress and egress which, it declares,
beIng by Its terms general in nature requires definition and'
IF
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or example, a truck which formerly entered the street sto ed in
f!ont of the landowner '8 industrial premises and then in ieavi~P
~n~~d along the street in the same direction: may bec~use of theg~.f~~
o
e street, be unable to turn around in it after o'ne end is blocked and
for that reason, bo unablo to usc the street for access to the land. '
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cies or the persuasive precedents served as the basis of the
opinion. There is an intimation that it was the latter in the
statement: "Many authorities and writers have either declared or intimated that the creation of a cul-de-sac, that is,
the blocking of access to the next intersecting street in one
direction is compensable, although the access still exists in
the opposite direction to an intersecting street. In other words,
the easement is to that extent." A list of cases from other
states, together with citations to texts and law reviews is
appended to support this statement,1 The conclusion is first
reached and then justified in a manner that suggests a weigh~
ing of policies: ' , We do not fear that permitting recovery in
cases of cul-de-sacs created in a municipality will seriously
impede the construction of improvements, assuming the fear
of such an event is real rather than fancied. The damage to
the property owner is immediate and direct. The value of
the use of the property is directly affected. To be able to get
onto the street immediately in front of the property is of
little value if that is as far as he can go. If his access to the
next intersecting street in both directions and one way is cut
off, his easemel,lt, if it has any value to him at all, has certainly been impaired. We conclude, therefore, that the right
of access extends in both directions to the next intersecting
street." Being more concerned with t.he reduction in value
of plaintiff's property than with the fear that the allowance

i

i

lTh.ere are also persuasive precedents against this conclusion: Meyer
v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (19 S.at. 106, 41 L.Ed.199]; New York C. 4'
St. L. R. Co. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134 [190 N.E. 562]; City Of Bellevue
ele reI. Vickery v. Stedman, 138 Ohio St. 281 [34 N.E.2d 769] j Davis
v. County Commissioner8, 153 Mass. ·218 [26 N.E. 848, 11 L.R.A. 750J j
Nichols v. Inhabitants Of Richmond, 162 Mass. 170 [38 N.E. 501J j
Warner v. New York, N. H. 4' H. R. Co., 86 Conn. 561 [86 A. 23J •
Cram v. City of LacOnia, 71 N.H. 41 [51 A. 635, 57 L.R.A. 282J
Kachele v. BridgelMrt Hydraulic Co., ·109 Conn. 151 (145 A. 756].
Micone v. City of Midc'lletown, 110 Conn. 664 (149 A. 408J; Taylor .;,
Cooke, 11~ Conn. 162 [154 A. 349]; Kreb8 v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584 [154 A.
131] j Ch~cago 4' N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com., 167 Wis. l!i5 116t
N.W. 266] j Arcadia Realty Co. v. City of St. Louis 326 Mo. 273 [30
S ..W.2d 995J; Wilson v. Kansas City, - - Mo. - _ [162 S.W.2d. 802J;
O~ty of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1 [133 S.E. 674]; Jarnagin v. Louisiana Highway Com., (La.App.) 5 So.2d 660; Powell v. McKelvey,
56 Idaho 291 [53 P.2d 626J; Kemp v. City of Seattle, 149.
Wash. 197 [270 P. 431J; PoniMhil v. Hoquiam Sash d Door Co., 41
Wash. 303 [83 P. 316]; City Of Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91
[122 S.W.2d 187]; Ralph v. Hazen, 68 App.D.C. 55 [93 F.2d 68J;
Freeman v. City of Centralia, 67 Wash. 142 [120 P. 886, Ann.Cas. 1913D
786J; Richmond v. City Of Hinton, 117 W.Va. :!:!;l [11l5 S.E. ~IIJ'
Olsen v. Jacobs, 193 Wash. 506 [76 P.2d 607J; De R08sette v. Jet!er80~
County, 28S Ky. 407 [156 S. W.2d !ti5 J.

i
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of recovery will impede improvements, ~he majority allows
...
recovery and thus creates th~ prop~~y rIght..
It is implicit in the majorIty opmIOn, ho,,:ever, tha~ such
a property right was already inherent in the nght,. a~tte,d1y
of obscure origin, of ingress and egress. The op:m~n states
that in spite of the policy not to impede. beIleficIa~ II?P:ovements "the courts cannot ignore soun,dand settl~d p~m~lpl~~
of law safeguarding the rights and property o~ md~Vld~:~. t
It also states, after describing the cul-de-sac In ~~e pI' ,en
case, "that plaintiff's property .has b,~en~,a~~~~d,by t~i
impairment cannot be here qu~stlOned.. ~h~ s~~t~lYlent ;t~~i
"If he has access to the next mtersectmg-stree.t ~n ~otli, dl
rections and one way is cut off, his eas~~e~t')~'!~,lias, a~r
value to him at all, has certainl! been)~,~;~l:';~,.'~.s~~,
that plaintiff's easement emb:a?es the,rIg~t}n,~ti~~10~."
Whether the majoritybPImo~·· all~;ws '"r~c.0v:e~ ,~.n . ~h.~
ground· that there has been .a~ ,~paIrme~t,'of,,~~~;,~'pe1
right inhering in the right of mgress~d ~g;,ess',,'or ·on t,~
ground that such a right should now be Judiclall~ create~}
cannot subscribe to it.
.
,.
h'
. The basic question in this appeal is whether'~,e':p:operty
that plaintiff alleged was taken ordam~gedexlsted ,~t al~~
If the· abutting owner has an easement m .the.stree~ 'longI~
tudinally to the next intersection inea~h dIrectIon, compen,.
sation must be paid for the impairment: of that easemen~.
(See United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333,339 [30'S.Ct. 521,
54 L.Ed. 787].) If he does not have such aneaseme~t ~e cat?'have no recovery even though the value '. of the a~uttmg property may be diminished as a result· of the Improvement.
(Reichelderfer v. Quinn; 287 U. S. 315;~19[53S..Ct.17~, 77
L.Ed. 331, 83 A.L.R. 1429] ; Eachus'v',Los 4,ngeles et~'llifl;
00., 103 Cal. 614, 617 [37 P.750, 42 Am.Sp~ep., 1491; Ro8,~
State of Oalifornia, 19 Cal. 2d 713,,73?,744 [~23 P;~~
505] ; Rigney v. Ohicago, 102 Ill. 64,80; 'Ody .of Wtnchester
v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 550, 552 [144 N.E.333, 36 A.L.R. 5201,
118 A.L.R. 921.)
.
. f' . d
There is nothing in the history of the right 0 mgress an
egress to indicate that it embraces any su~h ~a.semen~..Th~
right of ingress and egress is a creation of JudICIal deCISIOn.

v.

lThe origin of the whole doctrine of abut~ers' rights. is graphicallYNdeo
scribed in the ~issenting °9P~n~~ O~!\~~st[l:: ~.~~e;2~ ~9u~~~.v872j~
York and H. R. R. Co., 1, . .
,
,
f lit
"The plaintiff' 8 rights, whether expressed in terms of property or 0 co
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(See Orane v. Hahlo 258 US 142 4
514].) lUi operation' as a Ih~it t ' [ 2 S.Ct. ~14, 66 L.Ed.
by municipalities and public tl~~n on .st;eet Improvements
York elevated railway
UIII les orlgmated in the New
cases.
n th 1 d'
v. New York Elevated Railw 0
e ea mg case of Story
146], an injunction was sou ~ 0.,90 N:Y. 122 [43 Am.Rep.
elevated railway in the t g tt to res~raIn the erection of an
s ree on WhICh l ' 'ff'
a butted. The court held th t th
p amtl s property
vated railway purposes wa ~
e .use of the street for ele·
right of way for street
s mconslstent ~ith the use of the
the land originally;laid !~~:S:~~eeThe Clty had subdivided
the land by deeds conta' .
ts and lots, and conveyed
on the maps should formmg a co~enant that the streets shown
bl'
ever remam open
ways. The court cited the d'
as pu IC streets and
.
or mary rule th t
mg a . conveyance that reersto
f
a ' a grantor
mak·
a map h
'
not dIvert the lands to any use mconsist
.
s owmg
streets
can·
t .h
en Wit the normal
uses of the street Th
.,
.
e court held that thO
th e Clty In its role as subd' 'd
18 rule applied to
El evat ed
'
'
lVI er.
.
Ratlway 00. 104 NY
26 In Lah r v. Metropolttan
the court held that e~en h"
8 [10 N.E. 528], however
their title from the city aW
the abutters did not deriv;
as existed in the Story case nth ad no express covenant, such
of access to the street Th e~ n.evertheless had an easement
under the New York statut~ w~18 of the decision was that
trust was created for the benefit o;~~y stre.ets were opened a
for the benefit of abutt'
e pubbc at large and also
,
mg owners. The
t
'
cour held that an
easement of access was I'm l' 't .
.t t ~o k care to hold that the
P lCl
m the trus
tL
1
abuttin
" ~ter, however,
ordmate to any reasonabl
g owner s rIghts are sub·
e use of the street made by public
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authorities to facilitate general travel.
New .Y ork
L. &- W. R. 00., 128 N.Y. 157 [28 N.E. ,640,,14, L.R-A., 133] ;
Rigney v. New York O. &- H. 00" 217 N.Y., 31, [111 N."FJ;
226].) Presumably the public right to us~.}h~e: 'street; was
reserved if the city subdivided and sold thelot,s ,l:pt~~ street;
conversely compensation for the normal uses
th,~ str~~t,:~as
paid if the street or highway was condemned 'or conveyed.
(See Davis v. Oottnty Oommissioners, 153 Mass. 218" (26 N.E.
848, 850, 11 L.R.A., 750); 13 Va.L.Rev. 334.)~ile the
normal uses of the street are bound to change with the times,
the streets are invariably characterized as
rights of
WQ.
,,'
:
In Eachus v. Los Angeles Railway 00., 103 Cal,. 614 [37 P.
750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149), upon which plaintUf reli,es heavily,
the city had likewise subdivided and sold the, property owned
by 'the plaintiffs. California, like New York, later extended
abutters' easements to cases where title was not derived from

Ot

publi~

theThe
city.trust that arises from the appropriation of land for
public thoroughfares is for the benefit of the, public at large
and only incidentally for the benefit of abutting owners. The
extension of the abutting owner's rights in the present case
makes th~ primary consideration the bene:fj.t of ahutting own·
ers rather than the benefit of the public. Hith~rto no, California case has ever defined the right of ingress or egress as
inclusive of an easement to the next intersecting street. The
rule has been that the right of ingress and egress is limited
to adequate and reasonable access to the property from the
street, that it does not extend to the full width of the street,
or to the full length thereof, or even to all points upon the
street in front of the abutting property. It is sufficient if
there is access to a street that in turn connects with the gen-,
eral street system. Any improvement that does not materially
interfere with such access does no cdmpte'nsable damage. The
California Vehicle Code and city traffic ordinances abound
with regulations that limit a property owner's freedom of
movement upon the street on which his propertyabuts.ThWi
"U" turns or the making of left turns upon emerging from
a building or private driveway are frequently prohibited, and
the diversion of traffic into one-way streets is common.
quently traffic moving in opposite directions is separated by
some physical barrier such as a raised curbing. The~e re-
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strictions have the same effect whether they ensue from traffic regulations or physical obstructions and there is no more
reason to allow compensation because of the resulting diminution in property values or the inconvenience of circuity of
travel in the one case than in the other.
The newly created property right in this case is inconsistent not only with the trust from which the right of ingress
and egress is derived, but with the established rule in this
state and others that street improvements give rise to no compensable damage if there is no injury to the abutting owner
different in kind from that suffered by other property owners
and the general public. This rule is repudiated in the majority opinion: "If he has a property right and it has been
impaired, the damage is necessarily peculiar to himself and is
different in kind than that suffered by him as a member of
the public generally for his particular right as a property
owner and not as a member of the pUblic has been damaged."
This statement draws its conclusion from an assumption of the
very thing to be proved. The question is whether or not the
owner has a property right that has been impaired, and it
cannot be assumed that he has without drawing a line behveen
his property and all the other property in the community.
When the majority opinion draws the line at the next intersection it arbitrarily attaches a right to abutting property in
one block on the street, but not to abutting property on the
same street in the next block Or to property abutting on
neighboring streets, even thougb they may likewise be diminished in value as a result of the improvement and the Owners
may be similarly inconvenienced by circuity of travel. Recovery therefore depends upon the accident of location. 1
Whatever difficulties may arise in applying the rule requirlThe concurring opinion attempts to draw a distinction bet.ween abut~
ting Owners in the block on which the obstruction exists and other owners,
on the ground that "All vehicles entering the block must either turn
around or back out in order to leave it. " This inconvenience is not essentially different from the inconvenience of circuity of travel, and it is not
compensable for the very reasons advanced in the concurring opinion
with regard to circuity of travel. (See also Jones Beach BlYUle'IJard Estates v. MOBeB, 268 N.Y. 362 (197 N.E. 313, 100 A.L.R. 487]; 'Ralph v.
Hasen, 68 App.D.C. 55 [93 F.2d 68, 71]; City of }f'ort Smith v. Van Zandt,
197 Ark. 91 [122 S.W.2d 187].) It is commonplace in the operation of
motor vehicles to turn around on streets or back out therefrom just as it
is to back out from property where there is no space for turning the
vehicles. The right of ingress and egress is no more impaired in such
than
a one-way
street or divided highway where oue cannot
situations
turn
around
or on
back
out,
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damage to the public. The court held thai' 'the plaintiff col1ld)
not make such a showing under' the allegedfacts,"declEtrihg:'
"The access from plaintiff's lot to the street: has not been'
cut off or impeded, and if plaintiff and his' ilI1lnediate'neigh~1
bors have more occasion to pass through' 'the street; than the'
public at large, this is an inconvenience' in degree: only, and
is not an injury in kind different from thatsustained':bythtl'
public. " The narrowing of a' street by' one"11alf immediatelY:
opposite a lot, is in principle no different: fromtner clbsitlg:
of .the street in one direction with access'left.unimpeded in'
. ; . ,.,t' , .
'i
the other.
In Reynolds v. Presidio etc. R. R.Oo., 1 Cal.Ap·p;;229 [81
P.1118]; the complaint alleged that the layingof..streetcar
tracks near the boundary of plaintiff's;propeity~;has:,".'ob~
structed. ingress to and from said property!' 'Indenying
damages the court said: "There is no allegation that the ·ob~.
struction prevents the plaintiff from having access ;to,and
from her property. . .. Such obstruction clearly would not.
prevent the plaintiff from getting on or off her lot to the
public street."
Where; however, the obstruction cuts off access to the
street an injury results that is peculiar to the property and
different in kind from that suffered by the general public.
The distinction is forcefully brought out in Hargro v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623, 628 [26 P. 1106]. In that case th~ defendant
constructed on a public alleyway a building that occupied
the whole alley along the plaintiff's property line. The court
affirmed an order enjoining the maintenance of the. building.
After approving the doctrine that. the obstruction of a public highway of itself. does not constitute a specif\.l in.jury. t~
an abutting property owner, the court stated:, ','But it has
never been held that an individual cannot,maini~iA!anact.ip~
to abate an obstruction which, while opstructing,.tli.e"publi~·
highway, also cuts off access from his premises to th~\Publi~
highway. So far as it does this, it becomes a private nuisance.
His complaint is, not that it obstructs the street or road, bu,t
that it prevents him from reaching it." (See, also, Sohau/eZe
v. Doyle, 86 Cal. 107 [24 P. 834] ; Strong v. Sullivan, 180 Cal.
331 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 343] ; Williams v. Los Angeles Ry.
Co., 150 Cal. 592, 594 [89 P. 330].)
In Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467 [181 P. 657], the complaint alleged that the plaintiff owned certain land subject
to an easement of way in the puhlli: and that the defendant
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obstructed this public highway by building and maintaining
a fence acros~ it an? .thre~tened to plow up the highway.
The ~ourt demed an InJunctIOn, declaring: "It is well settled
th~t If ~n obstruction which is wrongfully erected and main~aI~ed In a public highway constitutes a nuisance which inJurIOusl~ affects a private person equally in common with
the pubhc at large, a private action may not be maintained
~o abate the nuisance. (Blanc v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 156.) It
~s ?nly where t~e free use of the property of a private person
18. mte:fered w.Ith by such an obstruction that he may have
hIS prIvate. actIOn to abate the nuisance reSUlting therefrom
... there IS ~o gr.ound for an action by a private person to
abat~ a ~ublIc nUIsance resulting from the obstruction of a
pubhc hIghw.ay where it merely appears that the person
~ould be subJected to personal inconvenience by the obstructIOn or. pl~ced under the necessity of traveliug by a much
more CIrCUItous route to reach his destination." (180 Cal.
467, 468, 470; see, also, 2 Wood on Nuisances, 853, sec. 645;
42 Co~umb. L. Rev. 5~6, 613; 4 Rest., Torts, 216 et seq.)
WhIle t~ese are n~ll~ance cases they are directly in point,
fo:an actIOn to enJOIn a public nuisance cannot be main~aIned u.nless it constitutes an injury to a private right. It
IS establIshed that a property right must be invaded before
co~pens~tion is .all~wed under article I, section 14 of the
CalIfornla ConstItutIOn. The constitutional provision creates
no property rights; it protects those that already exist. That
~hIch was dar::num ab~que. injuria before the adoption of the
or .d~maged clause IS stIll damnum absque injuria. "The
pr~vIsIOn (art. I, sec. 14) permits an action against the state
WhICh cannot be sued witho~t its consent. It is designed, not
to create n~w causes of actIon, but to give a remedy for a
cause of a~tlOn that would otherwise exist. The state is therefore not lIable under this provision for an inJ'ury that .
d
'~nJur~a.
. . I f the property owner would have
IS
ammtmb
a sque
no cause of action were a private person to inflict the damage
he can have no claim for compensation from the state ,:
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles 19 Cal2d 19 24 [119 p'
2d 1J.)
" , .
The rule, ~owever, is not derived solely from ~he nuisance
cases. Thus ill Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal 274
[57 P. 82J, th.e .San Francisco Board of Supervisors p~ssed
an order prOVIding for the reduction in the width of Turk
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Street from 100 feet to 68 feet 7 inches. The abutting owners
claimed that the improvement could not be made without
providing compensation for the damage the improvement
would cause their property. In sustaining a demurrer to
their petition for certiorari the court declared: "The property which an abutting owner has in the street in front of
his land is the right of access and of light and air, and for
an infringement of these rights he is entitled to compensation.
This right is peculiar and individual to the abutting owner,
differing from the right of passing to and fro upon the
street, which he enjoys in common with the public, and any
infringement thereof gives him a right of action... , The appellants herein do not, however, claim that the reduction in
the width of the street will in any respect interfere with their
enjoyment of light and air, or that access to their lots is in
any degree impaired. Indeed, in view of the fact that by
the proposed reduction of the street it will have the same
width as the majority of streets in the city, such contention
could not be made. . . . The damage which the appellants may
sustain by reason of a diminution in value of their lands is
not damage for which they are entitled to compensation....
'The right of abutting owners in the streets is not of that
absolute character that they can resist or prevent any and
all interference with the street to their detriment, or which
can be asserted to stay the hand of the municipality in the
control, regulation, or improvement of the streets in the public interest, although it may be made to 'appear that the
privileges which they had theretofore enjoyed; and the benefits they derived from the street in its existing condition,
would be curtailed or impaired to their .injUry·bythe changes
proposed.' (Reining v. New York etc; 'Ry:' Ca.,. 128 i N.Y.
157 [28 N.E. 640, 14 L.R.A. 133].)I~ 'has: been held-in
other states that even the entire closing ora'street lipon' which
property abuts does not give to the owner a right of'co~pen;.
sation, so long as there are other public streets by' which he
has acceSi! to his land. The mere inconvenience thereby eXperienced is not a damage for which he is' entitled to compensation." (124 Cal. 274, 280.)
,
In McCandless v. City o/Los Angeles; 214-Cal. 67 [4 P.2d
139], involving a claim for damages tinder article I, section
14, recovery was allowed because the injurywas'regarded as
peculiar to the abutting property. The court declared:
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"Cases illustrating the rule that an abutting property owner
may suffer special damages peculiar to himself and indepen.
dent of such damage a.'3 he sustains in common with other
property owners and the public by reason of the construction
of railroad tracks in the street adjacent to his property are
these: O'Connor v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 122 Cal. 681
[55 P. 688] ; Smith v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 146 Cal. 164
[79 P. 868, 106 Am.St.Rep. 17] ; Fairchild v. Oakland & Bay
Shore Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 629 [169 P. 388J ; Lane v. San Diego
Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Oal. 29 [280 P. 109]." (214 Cal. 67, 70,
71.) In holding that the subway, approach and railings a,s
constructed greatly" interfer,~d with the free use by the plaintiff of the street in front of her property for the purpose of
ingress and egress" the court quoted from Brown v. Board of
Supervisors, supra, as follows: "The property which an
abutting owner has in the street in front of his land is the
right of access and of light and air, and for an infringement
of these rights he is entitled to compensation. This right is
peculiar and individual to the abutting owner, differing from
the
. right of passing to and fro upon the street, which he enJOys in common with the public, /lnd any infringement thereof
gives him a right of action." (See, also, Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry., 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149J ;
Lane v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P. 109J ;
Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592, 594 [89
P: 330] ; Hargro v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623 [26 P. 1106] ; Geurk~nk v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 P. 570J ; Rose v.
State of California, 19 Cal.2J 713 [123 P.2d 505].)
The identity of the tests in the nuisance case.q and actions
for damages under article I, section 14, is forcefully brought
out in Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171 [88 P. 713], in which the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a railroad in a
Rtreet. In sustaining a demurrer to the complaint the court
declared: "Generally speaking, a pUblic nuisance does not
furnish ground for action by a private person, but such public nuisance may inflict upon an individual such peculiar injury as to entitle him to maintain a separate action for its
abatem.ent? ?r to recover damages therefor. . . . The injury
to the mdlvldual must, however, be different in kind and not
merely in degree from that suffered by the general pUblic.
(Aram v. Schallenberger, 41 Cal. 449; Bigley v. Nunan, 53
Cal. 403; Hogan v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 71 Cal. 83 [11
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P. 876].) Ordinarily, an obst~ction. to a h~ghwa!, .if ~
authorized and illegal, is a pnbhc nmsance. "The lllJUry 18
to the right to travel upon the highway, ,which right resides
in the public generally. Suchobsti"uctionptay,however,
constitute a private nuisance as well. Evert,owner ~fland
abutting upon a highway has ~ right of a?,cessfrom ~~sl~d:
to the highway and from thc,hIghway to b~ land." .rrh~s rIght
of access is an easement, and an obstructIon ,to the, ,hIghway
which at the same time obstructs ihis easem~nt is a.. p~?,uliar
injury to the abutting landowner and gives him' a (lause, Df
action." Holding that the cDmplaint ~as' insufficient because
it did nDt allege that the "right Df passage b~twe~n::t~?,str~et
and his premises" was impaired, the court decla:r:~(l= ; .Th~se,
facts alDne do nDt make it appear to th? co~rt:,thl;\~:~e)I~~7,
tiff's right of passage between the.streetan?hI~: pre~e~:
will be in any degree affected." Tlie C,Durt later. ~til.ted:
"We do. not overlook the consideration that,under t~e cDn-.
stitutiDnal prDvision that 'private prDperty shall n~t beta~en
or damaged for public use withDut just cDmp'~nsat~oIl havmg
first been made' ... damages may.be recDvered by an abutting owner fDr any public use of a street whichdamage8 his
adjDining property or his easement of access· to ~d from the
street . . . But the cDmplaint, whether seeking damageS after
the construction Dr an injunction before, must· show SDme
actual Dr threat~ned injury to' a private property right Df
the plaintiff, and this the present complaint. fails to' do."
(150 Cal. 171, 174, 175; see, also., Wolf! v. C'tty of Los Angeles, 49 Cal.App. 400 [193 P. 862]; City of San Mateo v.
R~'lroad Commission, 9 Cal.2d 1 [68 P.2d 713].)
Under the majDrity opinion new private property rights
representing millions Df dollars have. been carved out of public streets and highways, at the expense nDt alDne of the public treasury but of the public safety. Of recent years the
grDwth Df traffic has necessitated the cDnstructiDn of highways with fewer intersecting streets to. expedite the flDw of
traffic and reduce the rate Df mDtor vehicle accidents. Such
highways have been constructed thrDugh the city Df San
Rafael, and the Arroyo. SecD Parkway from Los Angeles to.
Pasadena, and the cDnstruction Df many mDre is cDntemplated.
In such cases it will be necessary either to close the cross
streets or to carry them under or Dver the freeway, bDth costly
prDjects. The plans cDntemplate Dverhead or subway cross-
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ings every few blocks ~ver the freeway, necessarily creating
cul-~e-sacs of .the remaIning streets. Similar improvements

. j

a~e Involved In the separation of grades of railroads and
hIghways, for it is usually necessary to make a dead end of
one or .more streets as a highway is raised or lowered to cross
the ~aIlroad tracks. In the present case the cul-de-sac on
SterlIng Street was .an integral part of the rearrangement of
the streets o~ the CIty of. San Francisco made necessary by
the constructIon of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay B 'd
Th
t f
k'
rI ge.
e cos 0 ~a Ing such improvements may be prohibitive
~ow that new rIghts are created for owners of property abuttIng on streets that would be at right angles to the improvements, for these rights must be condemned or ways constr~lCted over or .under the improvements. The construction
of Im~rovements IS bound to be discouraged by the multitude
of claIms th~t. would arise, the costs of negotiation with claimants or of lItIgation, and the amounts that claimants might
recover. Such claims could only be met by public revenues
that ~ould otherwise be expended on the further development
ant Improvement of streets and highways.
. t . must be remembered that the question is not whether
eXIstIng easements should be taken without compensation
but whether private rights should be created for an arbitraril;
chosen ~o~p ?f private persons, necessitating tribute from
the .publIc If It exercises public rights of long standing in
the Interest of safe and expeditious travel on public thoroughfares.

Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January
17,1944. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.
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ADDIE LILLIAN BEALS, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
LOS ANGELES et aI., Respondents.
[1] Streets-Ownership-Rights of Abutter-Oompensation.-In
an action for an injunction to restrain a city from closing a
public alley, the fact that plaintiff's property is a corner lot,
abutting on two streets in addition to the alley, and that there
is a possibility of access over these adjoining streets, is not
ground for holding that the plaintiff has no property right or
easement in the alley or that it may be taken or damaged
without payment of compensation. (Expressly ,disapproving"
language to the contrary in Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467,
469 [181 P. 657].)
.
[2] Id.-Vacation-Oonclusiveness of Determination.-The act of
a city council in ordering the vacation of a street is legislativo
in character and is conclusive both as to the necessity and
convenience of the improvement and as to the extent of the
district to be benefited thereby.
[3] ld.- Vacation-Oonclusiveness of Determination-Fraud.The finality of the act of .a city council in ordering the vacation of a street is subject to an exception where the finding
of public convenience and necessity results from fraud or
collusion between the council and the private landowners.
[4] ld.-Street Opening Acts-Act of 1889,-Pleading-Fraud.In an injunction proceeding to restrain the city of Los Angeles from closing a public alley, a complaint alleging that the
vacation of the alley was sought solely by the city Department of Water and Power on the ground, among others, that
a valuable property right of the department might be utilized thereby and particularly that permanent buildings might
be erected on the land; that the department is the owner of
all lands abutting the portion of the alley to be closed, with
the result that it will acquire title to the land abandoned;
and that the proposed vacation is solely for the benefit of
the department, is not sufficient to show fraud or collusion.
[5] ld.-Street Opening Acts-Act of 1889-0ommissioners.[2] See 19 OaI.Jur.33; 25 Am.Jur. 418.
[5], See 19 Oal.Jur. 204.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Streets, § 33; [2, 3] Streets, § 18; .
[4] St:reetst § 219; [5] Streets, § 211; [6] Eminent Domain, § 199;
[7] Eminent Domain, § 43; [8,9] Emi,nent Domain, §196; [10]
Eminent Domain, § 43(1).

